

**MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE  
AUSTRALIA-INDONESIA PARTNERSHIP  
FOR JUSTICE, PHASE 2**

Binziad Kadafi

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## BACKGROUND TO THE PROGRAM

- 2017-2022, \$40 million – annual investment of <0.1% of Indonesian budget for law and security organisations
- Builds on long-standing partnerships since the 1990s, and follows on from AIPJ1 (2011-2017)
- Notably, latest phase includes ODA-eligible support to security sector through AFP, Border Force and Home Affairs
- Program focus areas: court reform, access to justice for women and girls, corruption prevention, commercial courts, corrections reform, transnational crime prevention, prevention of violent extremism, equity and social inclusion.
- Program aim: 'strong and accessible justice and security institutions that enhance respect for enforceable rights and rules-based governance systems and, over time, contribute to stability and prosperity in Indonesia and the region.'
- Implementation through Australian government agencies (for security pillar), local civil society organisations, and direct support to Indonesian government counterparts.

## KEY MESSAGES

- MTR conducted by Simon Henderson, Binziad Kadafi and Lisa Denney in mid-2019.
- Program is largely well-regarded by Gol and DFAT and MTR suggests good return on investment.
- Program has provided support to some critical reform processes, notably:
  - Women's and girls' treatment by courts
  - Implementation of small claims court and e-courts
  - National strategy and action plan to combat corruption
  - Corrections planning and management
  - Legal framework for counter-terrorism and national action plans and strategies for preventing violent extremism.
- MTR suggests narrowing focus areas to deepen support to achieve meaningful impact; enable greater coordination and adaptiveness; and make program more easily understood (protecting it from cuts).
- MTR suggests M&E systems strengthened to capture learning not just reporting of 'results'.

## WHAT WORKS?

- Supporting long-standing, genuine partnerships (behind the scenes):
  - Supports high quality CSO partners with established expertise and networks that means they can engage credibly with government and courts – AIPJ2 focuses on amplifying their advocacy and providing space for collaboration. So AIPJ2 plays a largely behind the scenes role aiming to enable and bring together local partners.
  - Program benefits from long standing support over decades and strong relationships with civil society organisations, courts and government. Not starting from scratch.
  - Court-to-Court collaboration drawing on professional peer communities has created trust over time and able to push reform issues.
  - Broadly aligned with partner priorities.
  - Key factor is also the openness and willingness of Indonesian government and civil society organisations to work together on areas of reform where shared interests exist.

## WHAT WORKS?

- Small scale budget incentivises strategic engagement:
  - Because AIPJ2's budget is a drop in the ocean in the context of wider Indonesian spend, this encourages the program to work in different ways.
  - They can't fund mass training programmes or use large numbers of TA.
  - Instead, must work through partnerships and build relationships to get traction and have targeted aims for change – rather than a focus on generic institutional strengthening.

## WHAT WORKS?

- Flexibility to adjust:
  - Flexible and responsive support on wide range of areas afforded by facility model.
  - Can easily add new activities/areas of work as opportunities or demands require.
  - This flexibility is welcomed by partners working in dynamic environment.
- Trusted and respected staffing:
  - Widely trusted and respected TL and Core Team with strong local networks and relationships
  - This is key to engaging with partners credibly
  - Also means DFAT provides the program with greater space and are less inclined to micromanage

## WHAT WORKS LESS WELL?

- Flexible but not adaptive?
  - Program may be flexible but this is not the same as being adaptive – in the sense of experimenting with different pathways to change.
  - Theories of change for program components are often implicit and under-articulated. This means they are not routinely revisited to determine whether they remain the best pathway to change.
- Transactional rather than transformational M&E:
  - Focuses primarily on capturing data to report results to DFAT.
  - What is missing – especially in areas like PVE where the evidence base is relatively small.

## WHAT WORKS LESS WELL?

- Risk of 'thin' reforms focused on policies rather than implementation?
  - Breadth of engagement across so many issue areas (review counted 20 reform issues and 21 partners) may make sense in the initial phase of a program, to test where there is appetite/opportunity for reform.
  - But program needs to narrow down and deepen engagement in a more targeted way to realise real impact of strategies/action plans/policies on people's lives. Programs can boast a lot of new pieces of paper but not real change experienced by people. This likely means supporting implementation, not just legal/regulatory/policy frameworks. The broad but thin approach is also incentivised by DFAT's PAF, which focuses on contribution to policy change, rather than changes in people's lived experiences.
  - Breadth makes program hard to explain and understand, which is a risk in current aid environment with the ever-present danger of funding cuts
  - Breadth makes coordination and adaptiveness a challenge because there are so many moving parts.



## WHAT WORKS LESS WELL?

- Balance between (whose) security and justice:
  - The security and transnational crime component of AIPJ2 has accounted for the majority of program spend to date – over 40% more programmatic expenditure than on law and justice work.
  - But its results are:
    - less systematically captured than work in the law and justice areas; and
    - there are questions about whether the security components are developmentally focused on improvements for Indonesians, or more limited to Australia's foreign policy goals (even if these may be shared with GOI).